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Biblioteca Julio Castiñeiras. Sistema de Información Integrado - Facultad de Ingeniería UNLP
Facultad de Ingeniería | 115 esq.47 | Horario: Lunes a Viernes 8 a 19 hs.
E-mail: bibcentral@ing.unlp.edu.ar
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Información bibliografica (registro INGC-EBK-000451) |
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Título: |
Fuzzy Social Choice Theory by Michael B. Gibilisco...[et al.]. |
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Autor:
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B. Gibilisco, Michael.
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Otros autores: |
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D. Clark, Terry.
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J. Wierman, Mark.
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N. Mordeson, John.
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E. Albert, Karen.
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M. Gowen, Annie.
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Editado por: |
Springer International Publishing :;Imprint: Springer,
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Año de publicación: |
2014.
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Lugar de publicación: |
Cham :
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Descripción física: |
xviii, 185 p. : il. |
ISBN: |
9783319051765
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Colección: |
Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing,
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Materias: |
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Mathematics in the Humanities and Social Sciences. |
Social sciences. |
Computational intelligence. |
Mathematics. |
Political theory. |
Engineering. |
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Notas: |
Fuzzy Social Choice -- Classical Social Choice Theorems -- Rationality of Fuzzy Preferences -- Arrow and the Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences -- Characteristics of Strategy-Proof Fuzzy Social Choice -- Fuzzy Blackâ_Ts Median Voter Theorem -- Representing Thick Indifference in Spatial Models -- Conclusion. |
Sumario: |
This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the social choice literature and shows, by applying fuzzy sets, how the use of fuzzy preferences, rather than that of strict ones, may affect the social choice theorems. To do this, the book explores the presupposition of rationality within the fuzzy framework and shows that the two conditions for rationality, completeness and transitivity, do exist with fuzzy preferences. Specifically, this book examines: the conditions under which a maximal set exists; the Arrowâ_Ts theorem;  the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; and the median voter theorem. After showing that a non-empty maximal set does exists for fuzzy preference relations, this book goes on to demonstrating the existence of a fuzzy aggregation rule satisfying all five Arrowian conditions, including non-dictatorship. While the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem only considers individual fuzzy preferences, this work shows that both individuals and groups can choose alternatives to various degrees, resulting in a social choice that can be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial. Moreover, the median voter theorem is shown to hold under strict fuzzy preferences,  but not under weak fuzzy preferences. By providing a standard model of fuzzy social choice and by drawing the necessary connections between the major theorems, this book fills an important gap in the current literature and encourages future empirical research in the field. |
URL: |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5
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Tapa y contenido (Amazon.com) |
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